Aims and Principles of the Criminal Trial: From Franz von Zeiller’s Zweck und Principien to Friedrich von Savigny’s Prinzipienfragen

Paolo Rondini

Università degli studi di Milano-Bicocca


Abstract: A comparative analysis of Zeiller’s Zweck und Principien and of Savigny’s Prinzipienfragen provides useful information for shedding new light on the animated debates and attempts to reform in a liberal way the regulations of the deutscher gemeinrechtlicher Strafprozeß followed in most Mitteleuropean countries during the first half of the nineteenth century. The growing awareness that adjective law should both protect human rights and promote personal freedoms led in fact many important German jurists to declare for a radical reform of the inquisitorial system and of the traditional forms of carrying out criminal trials.

Keywords: Criminal Law; Inquisitorial procedures; German criminal law scholars; Austria; Prussia

Forty years separate the publication of Franz von Zeiller’s Zweck und Principien der Criminal-Gesetzgebung (1806-1807) and the 1846 edition of the Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozeß-Ordnung, edited by Friedrich von Savigny. These were years filled with animated debates and attempts to reform the regulations of the deutscher gemeinrechtlicher Strafprozeß (i.e., the criminal adjective law of the German ius commune) followed in most Mitteleuropean countries during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The former was a substantial article, published in the first two volumes of the Jährliche Beyträge edited by Zeiller himself. The well-known Styrian jurist had attempted to offer a comprehensive account of the reasons which lay behind the choices made by the drafters of the Austrian code of criminal law and criminal procedure (the Gesetzbuch über Verbrechen und Schwere Polizei-Übertretungen) enacted in 1803. Zeiller and Sonnenfels had in fact been its main drafters and Referenten in Vienna’s legislative Court Commission[1]. On the other hand, Savigny’s Prinzipienfragen constitute a partially revised version of a detailed ministerial memorandum which the father of the Historical School of jurisprudence, as Justizminister für die Gesetzrevision, had commissioned a few years earlier to a group of his closest collaborators (Heydemann, Heffter, Eichhorn and Bischoff). Under the Minister’s supervision, in 1843 they had prepared a work with the provisional title of Denkschrift über die Principienfragen der neuen Strafprozeß-Ordnung[2].

Although they were living in radically different contexts from the point of view of timeframe and political-institutional backgrounds, both the Professoren and Hofräthe shared the opinion that the laws concerning the criminal trials needed to be formulated in such a way as to ensure public and private safety, safeguarding the citizens’ rights and limiting their individual freedom to the least possible degree[3]. What the two jurists disagreed on was how to pursue the aim of guaranteeing public order and social peace without dashing the subjects’ expectations of always being safeguarded in the full enjoyment of their personal belongings and interests, and consequently on which kind of judiciary and criminal adjective law to rely on. Their divergences of opinion were due to the different backgrounds in which they exercised their functions as legal practitioners serving the State at the highest levels.

Zeiller’s apology of the early 19th century Austrian procedural law sprang from an intellectual milieu which still had faith in the so-called Kabinettjustiz, on which the enlightened Despotism of the Hapsburgs was based. According to this peculiar system for dispensing justice, all the main decisions were taken by a small number of senior civil servants enlightened only by the sovereign directives and by their own judgement. On the other hand, the manifesto penned by Savigny and his collaborators was influenced by the long debate on the general principles of the criminal procedural law carried out by the Mitteleuropean jurists, in the wake of the diffusion of the Frühliberalismus and of the ideas favouring the reformation of the old inquisitorial court procedures used in many German States[4].

It is possible to discern in Zeiller’s words the heritage of a culture which still considered favourably the authoritarian idea of the relationship between State and individuals, justifying the use of traditional judiciaries managed by professional bodies for the sake of preserving public order and social peace. In Savigny’s remarks, on the other hand, there is the echo of the decades-long disputes between German jurists about the legal principles (theProzeßmaxime) which legislators were supposed to take into account when shaping a new procedural law (a new reformierten Strafprozeß) (such as, e.g., the oral and public nature of trials, the adversary procedure, the free and personal conviction of judges in evaluating evidence, and the fully appealable nature of court decisions).

From the analysis of Zeiller’s Zweck und Principien it clearly emerges just how much the ideology of the Austrian code of 1803 was influenced by Kant’s theory of the categorical imperative, and by the ideas that Feuerbach developed on the subject of psychological compulsion. Punishment imposed by the State was not simply seen as the necessary consequence of unlawful conduct altering the social balance to be inflicted with no expectation of any form of benefit for the community or individual citizens. Rather, it was a punishment which was expected to have the general effect of preventing any further kind of unlawful conduct[5].

This particular preventive purpose of criminal laws operated on three levels of «mechanical, moral and psychological limitation» of the will to commit criminal acts. The first kind of limitation was to be dealt with by the Police who were meant to thwart any attempt to breach the law. On the other hand, the Government’s task was to promote the morality of behaviour and remove any obstacle that might prevent individuals from distinguishing good from evil and from acting in their own and in the community’s interest. Last but not least, psychological coercion was aimed at persuading people that violation of the legal rules would always cause greater suffering than the supposed benefits gained from their crimes[6].

Thus, public and private safety could be more efficiently guaranteed by threatening to inflict on any perpetrator of a behaviour that had been previously qualified as unlawful a punishment set ex ante in accordance with the gravity of the breach in question. Once it had been established how to restrict such unlawful behaviour and how the judicial authorities were meant to prosecute those who had decided to commit a crime in spite of such a dissuasive mechanism, the legislator was then obliged to operate by limiting individual freedom and activities in the least invasive way possible by adopting measures strictly aimed at «avoiding the most serious dangers threatening public safety»[7].

This entailed the need to resort not only to a «fair and reasonable description» of punishable behaviours and the penalties to be imposed, but also a precise formulation of all the general «useful prescriptions» to provide the judges with every possible clarification regarding the exact fulfilment of their duties, and the procedures to be followed in a trial[8].

For this purpose, Austrian legislators laid down a criminal procedure not only with the aim of carrying out and concluding trials as quickly as possible but so that it could also be considered both by citizens and legal practitioners a balanced compromise between a system of «terror» induced by «limitless care for collective safety» and a system of «blind indulgence» caused by an excessive love of «civil liberty»[9]. Besides wanting to appease the natural wish of the victims and of the whole community to see wrongdoers punished without delay, the State had in fact assumed the task of preventing any unlawful behaviour by showing the citizens that measures had been taken in order to enable the courts to be equally quick and efficient in prosecuting offenders without indulgence, freeing the innocent of the burden of unfair accusations, and submitting suspects to Police surveillance[10].

The real deus ex machina of a court system with such aims could not but be – according to Zeiller – a professional and permanent judge with considerable technical and practical expertise: a fine connoisseur of the mechanisms of law and also a skilful investigator, used to reasoning with «mature judgement» and «strict impassibility» in the reconstruction and analysis of events, in unravelling the twists and turns of the human mind, and in evaluating all the implications concerning the behaviour of each individual involved in the inquiries[11].

After all, in setting down inquisitorial-type rules, the Austrian code of 1803 (also known as Franziskana) referred precisely to the presence of judges of such a level operating in all the courts. Although it did not prescribe torture or extraordinary penalties, this form of inquisitorial procedure was not too dissimilar from the classic postulates of the ius commune (such as the primacy of the written form and secrecy; the use of legal proof; the ex-officio prosecution; an imperfect acknowledgement of the right to hire a defence counsel; the absence of a clear distinction between the different functions of investigating, prosecuting and judging; the appealable nature of judges’ decisions with the Revision system)[12]. In this archetype of a deutscher gemeinrechtlicher Strafprozeß the professional judges played a key role in applying the provisions laid down by the law in order to safeguard traditional values such as the established order, public authority, social peace, and trust in the law. In order to avoid the risk of arbitrary decisions, it was established that judges would carry out their tasks on the basis of a «sage discernment» only in the few set circumstances in which it would not be possible to provide them with anything but «general regulations» and «ready-made opinions». Such would be the case, for instance, in the hypothesis of deliberating on the presence of grounds justifying the remand of people under investigation or their arrest, or deciding how to carry out the examination of the accused or of a witness, or evaluating the existence of all the requirements to obtain a legal proof, or weighing up the legal force of clashing evidence[13].

Moreover, according to Zeiller it was not enough to impose restrictions on the discretion of the courts in the fulfilment of their task, in order for citizens to trust in the impartiality of the judges and in a fair and equal justice for everyone. The adjective law should in fact ensure that trials were conducted publicly in all their phases, and not only at the time of notifying and carrying out the sentence. Maintaining secrecy during the various stages of a trial would obviously give rise to the fear that «the law could be misinterpreted» through «obscure and unclear practices». This would inevitably jeopardize the citizens’ trust in such a kind of judicature and prevent from «justifying it in everyone’s eyes»[14].

Nevertheless, in spite of such a manifest stand for a public procedure, the Austrian code framed by Referent Zeiller re-proposed the traditional trial forms of the ius commune era; this included the complete secrecy over every step of the inquiry and of the acquisition of evidence. The reason why on this occasion the members of the Viennese Kompilationskommission had chosen to persevere in following the past procedural forms was explained precisely by the person who, more than anyone else, had helped produce the 1803 Gesetzbuch. Zeiller stated that «the precise nature and form of the criminal trial» was inexorably destined to change in time and in the various States, according to the political, social, cultural and scientific conditions of the people. For this reason it was often difficult for the legislative authorities to decide whether it would be generally preferable and feasible to adopt, among the many desirable reforms, innovations as radical as the «accusatorial system, the juries, the public nature of the judicial proceedings, etc.»[15].

According to Zeiller and the other Viennese court counsellors, at the beginning of the century the Austrian State lacked the prerequisites and the «preparatory institutions» necessary for the quantum leap, represented by the use of bold changes such as the ‘mixed’ procedural system adopted in France with the promulgation of the 1795 Code Merlin (the Code des délits et des peines, 3 brumaire an IV)[16].

Therefore, until the end of the Vormärz the Austrian subjects were always judged according to a strictly secret procedure which opened with a «preliminary inquisition» set up ex officio by professional judges once the «likely reasons» for an unlawful behaviour were known. During such preliminary inquiry it was necessary to ascertain that a crime had been indeed committed and the existence of «evidential material» sufficiently serious to declare the «formal indictment» against the alleged offender[17].

After the summons, the «ordinary inquisition» could start. During this second kind of inquiry, carried out in secrecy and recording the statements in writing, the judges were required to collect any proof, both against and in favour of the accused. The defendant did not have the benefit of choosing a trusted counsel, as it was assumed that thanks to their expertise and fairness the judges had the means to discover and acquire all the exculpatory evidence. The judgement was to be pronounced by a trial court on the basis of a report provided by the investigating judge who also took an active part in voting on the final deliberation. This decision had to be grounded on a careful evaluation of the legal value of both the incriminating and exculpatory evidence, and by giving the reasons why the trial judges had decided on a conviction, acquittal, or suspension of the trial with the absolutio ab instantia[18].

The rulings made both by the courts of first instance and the court of appeal could be revised on request of the convicted or with the Revision system by arguing an incorrect factual finding or an erroneous application of law. This involved automatically sending to the higher courts petitions concerning decisions made in the absence of a full confession, or those dealing with serious crimes or involving severe punishments (such as high treason, or death by hanging), or decisions presenting major differences with other rulings already given on the same case[19].

Zeiller thought deeply about one particular aspect of this complex regulation of criminal trials: the systematic use of legal proofs managed by professional judges instead of the personal conviction of the jurors. He attempted to demonstrate how in a specific political, institutional, social and cultural context it was difficult – if not impossible – to implement radical changes. As regards the procedure to be followed in order to ascertain the existence of a crime and identify its author, the Franziskana was in fact fully embedded in the late-eighteenth-century German tradition of the gesetzliche Beweislehre (i.e., the system of the legal proof) according to which judges could not evaluate through their own discernment the reliability of the evidence conforming to the legal requisites[20].

Precisely for this reason, within the Austrian legislative Commission unanimous approval was given to the argument according to which in a legal system focused on the sole presence of professional judges, and in the absence of an overall reform which was valid throughout the whole of the Hapsburg dominions, it would not have been possible to rely only on the discretion of judges in evaluating evidence without putting «public and private safety» at risk[21]. At the same time, it was not thought possible to bring about a far-reaching change, such as the one suggested by those – Filangieri above all – who proposed combining the «moral certainty» of the judges with the «rules prescribed by the State». Indeed, the prevailing conviction was that resorting to such a new version of the system of legal proof (a so-called ‘negative’ system) the State, each individual and the whole community would be exposed to the risk of being damaged by judicial decisions taken because of a personal persuasion that went against the legal evidence established by the codes[22].

Therefore, there was nothing to do but confide in the old gesetzliche Beweistheorie which enjoined logical and reasonable limitations on the judges who were required to play the threefold role of inquirers, counsels for the defence and decision makers, but without this forcing them into «keeping strictly to the only types of legal evidence laid down by the law» and hushing up the conflicting voice of their conscience[23]. It was the task of the judges to look for any possible material in support of both the accused and the defence. They then had to verify that it «complied with the legally prescribed requisites» in order to be admitted as evidence. Furthermore, they had also not to evaluate the various contrasting proofs separately but «in connection with the full evidential picture», so to ascertain whether the «full legal force» of such evidence was in the case at hand so negligible – indeed, practically non-existent – that the trial judges could not be forced to give a ruling that went against their conviction[24].

In spite of these attempts to reject the criticism towards the Austrian code of regarding judges as mechanical performers of the voluntas legis and slaves to the rules of legal evidence, one of the main remark made to the drafters of the Franziskana – and therefore primarily to Zeiller – was that of wanting to pursue the mirage of public and private safety allowing the «least space possible to judicial evaluation» about the relevance of evidential data[25].

Rather than acknowledging the impossibility of giving a comprehensive set of general and rational rules such as might appear convincing to those called upon to absolve the difficult task of discovering the truth, preference was given to attempting to lay down the rules defining the quality and even the quantity of the evidence necessary for a ruling to be given. The fear was that formulating only a few concise and general precepts might run the risk of being interpreted discretionarily by the judges[26]. But by operating in this way the limitations were «too restrictive on the judge’s decision», and the arbitrary power of ruling without any restrictions was confused with the possibility of carrying out a pondered and motivated «reflection in the light of clear principles established by the law»[27]. For this reason, only a few years after the 1803 code came into force, the question was raised as to whether it might be opportune to urge the legislative power to modify the prescriptive wording.

Nevertheless, a radical reform of the inquisitorial system codified in the Austrian Strafgesetzbuch was carried out only as a consequence of the revolutionary European Spring of 1848. That event traumatically showed the élites in power that it was time not only for a political and institutional change but also for a major reform of the legal system, reflecting the social, cultural and scientific upheavals of the previous few decades of the Vormärz.

In the 1840s the Prussian jurists and politicians were much more far-sighted. They managed to convince the Hohenzollern dynasty and the more conservative factions of the Berlin government that it was time to overhaul the administration of criminal justice which dated back to the Prussian Criminalordnung of 1805 (the Part I of the Allgemeines Criminalrecht für die preußischen Staaten). They also succeeded in turning into laws some of the suggestions and precepts devised by German criminal law scholars about the advantages of adopting a new liberal adjective law (a liberaler Strafprozeß).

With the sole exception of the abolition of torture, the trial system set out at the start of the nineteenth century by the drafters of the Criminalordnung showed very little difference from the inquisitorial system of the late ius commune period. At the end of a preliminary phase aimed at acquiring legal evidence and carried out by the investigating judge in secrecy and in writing, the sentence was pronounced by a panel of professional and permanent judges on the basis of a mere reading of the proceedings of the preliminary inquiry. This meant they were not directly involved in the various stages of the investigation and acquisition of the evidence. During the inquiry, the investigating judge could inflict punishments on liars (Lügenstrafen) or uncooperative and disrespectful people (Ungehorsamstrafen), whilst forms of psychological coercion could be carried out both on the accused and on witnesses by making the interrogations last for hours, or by demanding surprise interrogations, even at night. The accused had no right to appoint a defence counsel until the court’s decision passing a sentence, or a absolutio ab instantia, or an extraordinary penalty on the grounds of ‘semi-full’ proofs (Verdachtstrafe) was appealed[28].

Over the space of forty years various attempts were made to update the code issued at the beginning of the century, as the 1828Entwurf der Straf-Prozeß-Ordnung (i.e., the draft of a new criminal adjective code) and particularly the 1839 Verordnung, betreffend die Criminal-Gerichtsverfassung und das Untersuchungs-Verfahren (i.e., the law concerning the judiciary and the inquiry) testify. The latter provided, in the territories of Pomerania and Rügen, for trying out a procedure which allowed the judges to use circumstantial evidence and to impose penalties of an exclusively ordinary nature[29].

It was only with the drafting and the following circulation of the memorial illustrating the Principienfragen der neuen Strafprozeß-Ordnung – an initiative undertaken by Savigny in 1843 – that within Berlin government circles and at the highest levels of Prussian judiciary was it understood how advantageous it would be to adopt a system where trials were open to the public and conducted orally, as well as including certain essential principles (such as the intervention of the public prosecutor, an exhaustive cross-examination of the parties carried out in open hearings, the full acknowledgement of the accused’s right to defence and to challenge the judges, the repeal of the system of legal evidence, the possibility to appeal judicial decisions on the grounds of incorrect factual finding or legal errors)[30].

In the 1846 edition of the Principienfragen, Savigny himself specified that it was up to the State to proceed first of all with a general reform of the judicature, in order to create the office of the public procurator, as well as to distinguish between the different roles assigned to the State prosecutor, the investigating judge and the trial court made up exclusively of professional and permanent judges. Only after having completed this essential preliminary reorganization of the judiciary would it be possible to modify the forms of carrying out criminal trials in the manner described above[31].

As far as the criminal adjective law was concerned, the first step was to extend to the whole Prussian Kingdom the ‘mixed’ and ‘two-phase’ model which had remained in force in the Rhenish provinces after the end of the Napoleonic age.

At the end of the preliminary inquiry, carried out according to the criteria of complete secrecy and accurate recording of all judicial proceedings, the oral and public hearing began between the public prosecutor and the defence counsel before a panel of judges, so that the latter could personally observe the dispute between the two parties, interact with the accused and the witnesses, and supervise the acquisition of evidence[32]. Having an active role in admitting evidence rather than simply reading the trial records to gather the necessary information to pass judgment, the professional judges could be more precise in their evaluations not only about the connections between the facts, but also about the influence of the different moods (malignity, impetuosity in the affections, premeditation, free will etc.) of all the people involved in the inquiry. Furthermore, rather than simply trusting the skill, experience and impartiality of the investigating judge, the erkennende Richter (i.e., the presiding trial judges) were able to interrogate and confront the accused, the witnesses and the experts. In this way they could point to any contradiction between the various statements, or the possibility of their having been made as a result of threats, violence, confused states of mind, or interests of various kinds[33].

Public hearings also ensured the advantage of allowing the community to exert a certain degree of control over the conduct of the prosecution, the defending counsels and the judges, thus removing the suspicion of decisions being taken arbitrarily or under the influence of bias and inexperience. In this way the accused and also other citizens could rely on the equity and justice of the rulings given by the courts, and public opinion could have greater faith in the State, in the law passed in order to guarantee safety for all persons, and in justice being dispensed quickly and efficiently[34].

Clearly the adoption of such an archetype implied the essential presence in a trial of two key figures: the public prosecutor and the counsel for the defence. The law therefore had to guarantee the full enjoyment of the right to defence from a technical point of view and, at the same time, to give up the inquisitorial Offizialmaxime taking up the accusatorial Anklageprinzip instead. The latter postulated assigning the roles of accuser and inquirer to two distinct public officers: the prosecutor and the investigating judge[35]. The State’s interest in prosecuting criminals was to be represented by the former who had to gather, at the request of one of the parties or ex officio, the evidence of the presumed perpetration of a crime. He had also to carry out their careful examination, identify the people against whom prepare the case for judgement, and intervene in the inquiry on behalf of the State. On the other hand, the investigating judge was to act in the sole interest of the truth, and carry out the inquiries «within the specified directions and limitations» as reported by the public prosecutor. He had also to try to gather with the same degree of impartiality the proof both against and in favour of the accused[36].

A further major implication of resorting to the trial system proposed by Savigny was that it would be possible at last to renounce to the system of the legal proof, and ban both the extraordinary penalties inflicted on the basis of imperfect evidence and the Lossprechung von der Instanz (i.e., the absolutio ab instantia)[37].

The attempts made during the centuries to establish general and binding provisions relating to evidence had turned out to be inexorably ineffectual, given the difficulty in foreseeing ex ante the various combinations that might actually occur in real situations. The certainty of a fact originated from the evaluation of such a vast number of elements and circumstances to be taken into consideration at the same time in relation to each case that no law could provide a comprehensive compendium. Judges of course could not rule without adducing evidence which conformed to legal canons (confessions, witnesses’ statements, documents, circumstantial evidence) and to the requisites necessary to be admitted as evidence. It was nevertheless no longer possible to confide in the fact that the law could pre-determine the specific weight of such material, nor could it prescribe to the judiciary how to evaluate all of the contrasting proof and thus decide either in favour of or against the accused[38].

The solution suggested in the Prizipienfragen was therefore that of giving professional and permanent judges the possibility to pass judgment on the basis of their free «personal conviction» after having scrupulously analysed the sole evidence admitted by law with the aid of the rules of logic, experience and science. Such a judgment would have not been based on a personal sense of what was true and right – a Total-Eindruck as was the case of the verdicts pronounced by the juries – but rather it would have been the outcome of a series of interconnected rational arguments developed by experienced professional judges, who knew all about human nature and societal dynamics. Through the daily performance of their duties they became learned in «observing […] evaluating together all of the phases of the trial […] more rapidly […] without being influenced by the arguments of the prosecution or of the defence»[39]. Futhermore, in the statement of the grounds for the ruling the judges were required to give detailed explanations to the parties, and also to public opinion, about the complex procedures followed in the inquiry and the hearing, as well as in formulating a decision «according to logic and reason»[40].

This obligation of specifying the grounds for the conviction or the discharge of the accused constituted the key prerequisite in order to add to the framework devised in the Berlin Ministerium für die Gesetzrevision the last important detail concerning the full possibility of filing an appeal or contesting those decisions on grounds of nullity.

The possibility to challenge in a higher court the decision of a lower court on substantive or legal grounds was a prerogative that the convicted person could fully enjoy only in a Anklageprozeß, that is to say, in a public accusatorial judicial system where the public prosecutor and the defending counsel were on exactly the same footing[41]. This implied that the State was entitled to request the revision of an acquittal or of a mild sentence. As a consequence, the public prosecutor could appeal to a higher court asking to give a harsher ruling than the impugned decision[42]. Finally, it was also considered whether establishing in the whole Prussian Kingdom the Court of Cassation on the Rhenish and French model. Before this court it would have been possible to raise an issue of nullity resulting from an erroneous interpretation of substantive law (as would be the case if a crime had been misjudged as non-indictable, or if the wrong provision had been applied) and from a breach of the rules concerning the jurisdiction of the courts, their composition, and the way the trials were supposed to be carried out[43].

The reform plan suggested in these Prinzipienfragen met soon with general approval, and in the summer of 1846 the Prussian government enacted a law regarding new ways of conducting trials in the courts of the city of Berlin. As a consequence of the positive results of this reform, the following year it was enforced in the whole Kingdom, thus formalizing the definitive triumph of the ‘mixed’ and ‘two-phase’ trial system over the old inquisitorial procedure[44].

[1] F. von Zeiller, Zweck und Principien der Criminal-Gesetzgebung. Grundzüge zur Geschichte des Oesterreichischen Criminal-Rechts. Darstellung der durch das neue Criminal-Gesetzbuch bewirkten Veränderungen, sammt ihren Gründen, in Idem, Jährlicher Beytrag zur Gesetzkunde und Rechtswissenschaft in den Oesterreichischen Erbstaaten, Vienna, K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1806-1807, I (1806), pp. 71-185, and II (1807), pp. 1-98. About the role of Zeiller in the writing of theGesetzbuch über Verbrechen und Schwere Polizei-Übertretungen see H. Hoegel, Geschichte des Osterreichischen Strafrechts in Verbindung mit einer Erläuterung seiner grundsätzlichen Bestimmungen, Wien, Manz, 1904, I, pp. 85-95; M. Horrow, Grundriss des osterreichischen Strafrechts mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der historischen Entwicklung, Graz-Wien, Leykam, 1947, pp. 38-53; T. Rittler, Lehrbuch des österreichischen Strafrechts, Wien, Springler, 1954, pp. 17-18; H. Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, II, Neuzeit bis 1806, Karlsruhe, C.F. Muller, 1966, pp. 450-451; P. Leslaw, Die Bedeutung Zeillers für die Kodification des Strafrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der polnischen Strafrechtsgeschichte, in Forschungsband Franz von Zeiller (1751-1828). Beiträge zur Gesetzgebungs- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, W. Selb, H. Hofmeister (ed.), Vienna-Graz-Köln, Böhlaus, 1980, pp. 180-191; G. Kleinheyer, J. Schröder,Deutsche Juristen aus fünf Jahrhunderten, Heidelberg, Müller, 1989, pp. 327-330; F. Hartl,Grundlinien der österreichischen Strafrechtsgeschichte bis zur Revolution von 1848, in G. Máthé, O. Werner, Die Entwicklung des österreichisch-ungarischen Strafrechtskodifikation im XIX-XX Jahrundert, Budapest, Unio, 1996, pp. 13-54, especially pp. 35-44; A. Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto e ragioni del potere nel codice penale austriaco del 1803, inCodice Penale Universale Austriaco (1803), S. Vinciguerra (ed.), Padova, Cedam, 2001, pp. CCXIX-CCLXV; E. Dezza,L’impossibile conciliazione. Processo penale, assolutismo e garantismo nel codice asburgico del 1803, inCodice Penale Universale Austriaco (1803), cit., pp. CLV-CLXXXIII; P. Pittaro, Giustizia criminale e ragion di Stato, in Codice Penale Universale Austriaco (1803), cit., pp. CXLIII-CLIV; S. Tschigg, La formazione del Codice Penale Austriaco del 1803, in Codice Penale Universale Austriaco (1803), cit., pp. LI-LXVII, especially pp. LIX-LXVII; S. Vinciguerra, Idee liberali per irrobustire l’assolutismo politico: il Codice Penale Austriaco del 1803, in Codice Penale Universale Austriaco (1803), cit., pp. IX-XXXVIII; A. Padoa Schioppa, Storia del diritto in Europa, Bologna, il Mulino, 2007, pp. 469-470; C. Neschwara, Franz von Zeiller und das Srafrecht, in «Journal on European History of Law», 1 (2010), 1, pp. 4-15.

[2] See W. von Arnswaldt, Savigny als Strafrechtspraktiker. Ministerium für die Gesetzrevision (1842-1848), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003, pp. 44-45, 278-281; P. Rondini, Introduzione. Dal Denkschrift über die Principienfragen der neuen Strafprocess-Ordnung (1843) ai Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozess-Ordnung (1846), in F. von Savigny, Le questioni di principio concernenti un nuovo regolamento del processo penale, P. Rondini (ed.), Milano, Giuffrè, 2012, p. XIII.

[3] See Leslaw, Die Bedeutung Zeillers (supra note 1), p. 183; F. von Savigny, Die Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozeß-Ordnung. Ausgearbeitet im Justizministerium für die Gesetzrevision, W. Schubert (ed.), Frankfurt am Main, Lang Peter, 2011, pp. 26, 31.

[4] See E. Schmidt, Einführung in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1951, pp. 320-336; G. Haber, Probleme der Strafprozeßgeschichte im Vormärz, in «Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft», 91 (1979), pp. 590-636, especially pp. 598-609; A. Ignor, Geschichte des Strafprozesses in Deutschland 1532-1846. Von der Carolina Karls V. bis zu den Reformen des Vormärz, Paderborn, Schöningh, 2002, pp. 191-192, 214-217, 231-248, 259-263.

[5] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note 1), I (1806), pp. 71-79, and II (1807), pp. 1-3. See also Hartl, Grundlinien der österreichischen Strafrechtsgeschichte (supra note 1), p. 38; Vinciguerra,Idee liberali per irrobustire l’assolutismo politico (supra note 1), pp. XXIX-XXXVI; Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto e ragioni del potere (supra note 1), pp. CCXXIX-CCXXXII.

[6] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note), I (1806), pp. 71-74, and II (1807), p. 7.

[7] Ibidem, I (1806), p. 79, and II (1807), pp. 1-5, 7-8.

[8] Ibidem, I (1806), p. 79, and II (1807), pp. 1, 9-11.

[9] Ibidem, II (1807), pp. 3-5.

[10] Ibidem, II (1807), pp. 9, 12-13. See Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto e ragioni del potere (supra note 1), pp. CCLII-CCLIV; Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione (supra note 1), pp. CLXXIV-CLXXV.

[11] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note), II (1807), p. 12.

[12] Ibidem, II (1807), pp. 25-30, 32-72, 77-79, 87-89. See Hartl, Grundlinien der österreichischen Strafrechtsgeschichte, cit., (nt. 1), pp. 41-43; R. Pöltl, Die Lehre vom Indizienbeweis im 19. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 1999, pp. 357, 360; Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto e ragioni del potere (supra note 1), pp. CCXXXV-CCXLI; Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione (supra note 1), pp. CLXIV-CLXVII; Idem,Il nemico della verità. Divieto di difesa tecnica e giudice factotum nella codificazione penale asburgica (1768-1873), in Riti, tecniche, interessi. Il processo penale tra Otto e Novecento, Atti del Convegno (Foggia, 5-6 maggio 2005), M. N. Miletti (ed.), Milano, Giuffrè, 2006, pp. 13-77, especially pp. 25, 69-70; Pittaro, Giustizia criminale e ragion di Stato (supra note 1), pp. CXLVII-CXLIX; C. Povolo, Nella selva incantata degli indizi, in Idem, La selva incantata. Delitti, prove, indizi nel Veneto dell’Ottocento. Saggio di etnografia giudiziaria, Sommacampagna, Cierre, 2006, pp. 11-145, especially p. 30; P. Rondini, Ex sententia animi tui. La prova legale negativa nell’età della codificazione, Milano, Giuffrè, 2012, pp. 228-230.

[13] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note), II (1807), pp. 11-12.

[14] Ibidem, II (1807), p. 13.

[15] Ibidem, II (1807), p. 14.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Ibidem, II (1807), pp. 25-30. Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione (supra note 1), pp. CLXVII-CLXVIII.

[18] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note), II (1807), pp. 39-72. Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione (supra note 1), pp. CLXVIII-CLXXII

[19] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note), II (1807), pp. 77-79, 87-89. Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione (supra note 1), pp. CLXXII-CLXXIII.

[20] See Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione (supra note 1), pp. CLXXVIII-CLXXXII; Rondini, Ex sententia animi tui (supra note 12), pp. 229-231.

[21] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note), II (1807), pp. 42-43.

[22] Ibidem, II (1807), pp. 40-42. Rondini, Ex sententia animi tui (supra note 12), pp. 232-234.

[23] Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note 1), II (1807), p. 67.

[24] Ibidem, II (1807), pp. 48-50, 66-67. See Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto e ragioni del potere (supra note 1), pp. CCXXXV-CCXLI; Rondini, Ex sententia animi tui (supra note 12), pp. 234-240.

[25] See C. Mittermaier, Theorie des Beweises im peinlichen Prozesse nach den gemeinen positiven Gesetzen und den Bestimmungen der französischen Criminal-Gesetzgebung, Mannheim, Kaufmann, 1809, p. 227; Idem, Die Lehre vom Beweise in deutschen Strafprozesse nach der Fortbildung durch Gerichtsgebrauch und deutsche Gesetzbücher, Darmstadt, Heyer, 1834, pp. 83-85, 98, 361-362; Idem, Das Deutsche Strafverfahren in der Fortbildung durch Gerichts-Gebrauch und Lan-des-Gesetzbücher und in genauer Vergleichung mit dem englischen und französischen Straf-Verfahren, Goldbach, Keip, 1996 (Nachdr. der Ausg. Heidelberg, Mohr, 1845-1846), I, p. 534, also II, pp. 314-315; C. Pratobevera, Einige Bemerkungen über den Beweis aus dem Zusammentreffen der Umstände (Anzeigungen, Indicien) nach den Vorschriften des Oesterreichiscen Gesetzbuches über Verbrechen, in «Materialien für Gesetzkunde und Rechtspflege in den Österreichischen Erbstaaten», 1 (1815), pp. 143-168, especially 162-164.

[26] See Zeiller, Zweck und Principien (supra note 1), II (1807), pp. 27-29, 62-64; Pratobevera, Einige Bemerkungen (supra note 25), pp. 162-164; F. V. Barbacovi, Degli argomenti ed indizi nei giudizi criminali, Milan, Società Tipografica dei classici italiani, 1820, pp. 33, 43, 47-48.

[27] Pratobevera, Einige Bemerkungen (supra note 25), p. 164.

[28] See Schmidt, Einführung (supra note 4), pp. 260-262, 268-270; C. Richstein, Legale Beweistheorie und Beweiswürdigung im 19. Jahrhundert, in “Auss liebe der gerechtigkeit vnd umb gemeines nutz willenn”. Historische Beiträge zur Strafverfolgung, G. Jerouschek – H. Rüping (ed.), Tübingen, Diskord, 2000, pp. 191-215, especially pp. 192-195.

[29] See E. Gans, Beiträge zur Revision der preußischen Gesetzgebung, Berlin, Dunc-ker&Humblot, 1832, pp. 68-71, 76-77, 91-93, 96; C. Mittermaier, Teoria della prova nel processo penale del Dr. C. G. A. Mittermaier, Consigliere intimo e Professore in Heidelberg, traduzione italiana eseguita sull’originale tedesco dal Dr. Filippo Ambrosoli con molte aggiunte inedite dell’autore e con note del tra-duttore sulla legislazione austriaca, Milano, Sanvito, 1858, pp. 20-21; H. Zachariä, Handbuch des deutschen Strafprozesess. Systematische Darstellung des auf Quellen des gemeinen Rechts und der neuern deutschen Gesetzgebung beruhenden Criminal-Verfahrens, I, Göttingen, Verlag der Dieterichschen Buchhandlung, 1861-1868, pp. 13-14.

[30] Rondini, Introduzione (supra note 2), pp. XIII-XV, XXI-XXIV.

[31] Savigny, Die Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozeß-Ordnung (supra note 3), pp. III-IV.

[32] Ibidem, pp. 1-5.

[33] Ibidem, pp. 6-13, 17-19. Rondini, Introduzione (supra note 2), pp. XXVIII-XXXI.

[34] Savigny, Die Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozeß-Ordnung (supra note 3), pp. 28-31.

[35] Ibidem, pp. 9, 41-42.

[36] Ibidem, pp. 42-45.

[37] Ibidem, pp. 10-11, 62, 76, 133.

[38] Ibidem, pp. 67, 70-74. Rondini, Introduzione (supra note 2), pp. XXXII-XXXIV.

[39] Savigny, Die Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozeß-Ordnung (supra note 3), pp. 53, 55, 57, 65-66, 74.

[40] Ibidem, pp. 59, 62, 65-66.

[41] Rondini, Introduzione (supra note 2), p. XXXV.

[42] Savigny, Die Prinzipienfragen in Beziehung auf eine neue Strafprozeß-Ordnung (supra note 3), pp. 80, 84-85, 89.

[43] Ibidem, pp. 95-100. Rondini, Introduzione (supra note 2), p. XXXVI.

[44] See Arnswaldt, Savigny als Strafrechtspraktiker (supra note 2), pp. 44-45, 249-315; Rondini, Introduzione (supra note 2), pp. XXXVII-XL.

The Devil’s Advocate. Defence and Defending Counsel in the 18th Century Austrian Criminal Procedure

Andrea Massironi

Università degli studi di Milano-Bicocca

Abstract: The provisions of the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina on the intervention of the defending counsel in the trial seemed to be less strict than other contemporary European criminal rules. Since the 16th century the criminal law scholars from the German area read them on the one hand connoting the lawyer with increasing precision as an expert in law, on the other one limiting his leeway in order to not hinder the rapidity and effectiveness of the inquisitio. This perspective influenced the choices of the Austrian legislators, which were even toughened from the 18th century onwards in the work of legislative unification by Maria Theresia and in the following codes.

Keywords: inquisitorial procedure, Austria, defending counsel, Constituto Criminalis Carolina, Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana

In 1755 Johann Peter Banniza, illustrating the criminal procedure in his manual for Viennese students, explained that the accused had the possibility to rebut his charges by himself or with the assistance of relatives or non-relatives. Subsidiarily it was a duty of the judge ex officio, electing a defending counsel if necessary[1]. These rules were provided for by the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532), the main reference of the prominent professor’s treatise[2]. Nevertheless, at the end of these first notes, he warned that these principles were not observed everywhere, surely «nec in Austria», above all where the so called Ferdinandea (emanated in 1656 by Ferdinand III for the countries of the Habsburg Empire constituting Lower Austria) was in force: under the heading Von Advocaten, the Ferdinandea on the one hand prohibited the accused who was admitted to defence from having the assistance of a lawyer, especially if the crime was evident and already clearly proven; on the other hand, when serious reasons that justified the defender’s intervention had occurred, the leeway granted him was extremely limited. Indeed, he was bound by oath not to give bad advice in order to not hinder the search for truth, and he was allowed only to make sure that the accused did not omit something advantageous in his defence[3]. This way the burden fell on the judge to do his job with the utmost accuracy, searching for all the useful elements for the investigation, including the pro reo ones[4].

Joseph Leonhard Banniza, Johann Peter’s son, who retraced the footsteps of his father in his studies and teaching, almost two decades after his father wrote a work where he compared the common criminal procedure with the changes introduced by the most recent Austrian laws. Thus, he attested that the position of the defence regarding the accused seemed to have been toughened after the enacting of the Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana (1768): the accused usually was not given a defender, neither during the inquiry nor after it; and the exceptions to this rule were reduced to the minimum (a defendant, who could not defend himself because of ignorance, fear or illness; a particularly difficult case; very important circumstances). In any case, the evaluation of the exceptions was left to the judge’s discretion[5].

The two jurists were usually resolute on conservative positions. It is natural because they had been part, so to speak, of the establishment of the Habsburg Empire and had been fed the most classical juridical literature and were authors of works, which were certainly not original, but which can be numbered among the epitomes of (substantive and procedural) Austrian criminal law of the 18th century[6], so important that they were studied even outside the borders of their country[7]. The Bannizas should be given also credit for the development of Austrian criminal law scholars, independently from the German ones[8].

Furthermore, their writings were indicative of the transition to the achievement of a uniform Austrian criminal procedure that was attempted in those years in the Habsburg Empire, which was still characterized by a centrifugal system of law sources, result of a centuries-old accumulation and of the fragmentation of autonomies gathered under the wings of the biceps eagle. Overcoming the uncertainty arising from such a wide and contradictory clutter of laws was part of Maria Theresia’s plan of political centralization[9]. Thus, the Theresiana was composed with the aim – specified in its Patent of promulgation – to replace several laws dictating the discipline of the criminal trial in the different countries of the Empire still in the second half of the 18th century: the Ferdinandea, the so called Leopoldina (Landgerichts-Ordnung in Oesterreich ob der Ennß by Leopold I in 1675)[10], the so called Josephina (Neue peinliche Hals-Gerichts-Ordnung vor das Königreich Böheim, Marggrafthumb Mähren und Hertzogthumb Schlesien by Joseph I in 1707)[11], the Carolina, local laws and Roman law[12].

The choice of the Theresiana to confine the defender to a marginal role in the trial, but not to completely exclude him[13], does not surprise, at least for two reasons. First of all, because it was perfectly in line with the harshness that characterized the Theresiana, which was far from the Enlightenment influences, steeped in d’Ancien Règime mentality[14], so much so that it was born «irrimediabilmente vecchia» (hopelessly old), or even «quasi morta» (almost dead)[15], but nevertheless a model for other bodies of laws, as for example, the Norma interinale in Lombardia in 1786[16]. Secondly, because the Theresiana confirmed the spirit of mistrust of lawyers that distinguished Austrian criminal law and that was taken to the extreme in the Kriminalgerichtsordnung by Joseph II and in the Franziskana by Francis I (although the reasons for such a choice in the two codes was connected above all to a new conception of the role of the judge)[17].

The Theresiana indeed presented consolidated matters, which more than a century before, as we have mentioned, had already appeared in the Ferdinandea. The Kompilationskommission of Brunn, charged by Maria Theresia with the task to reorganize Austrian laws, was faithful to the demand of the sovereign to take the best from the bodies of laws by Ferdinand III and by Joseph I to create a new corpus, looking at the first one for substantive law and at the second one for the discipline of trials[18]. Thus, about the defence of the accused the Theresiana was inspired above all by the Josephina: with reference to the denial of a defending counsel, the text of the Josephina was literally transposed in the Theresiana, except for some expressions, such as a generic, but suggestive,Rechts-Freund which the more precise Defensor, Vertheidiger oder Beiständer corresponded to[19].

The Josephina and the Theresiana, sixty years apart, were parallel also in the explanation of such a provision, clearly explained with a discursive style, typical of the Habsburg way of drafting laws[20]: the intervention of a lawyer delayed the administration of justice, since experience showed that he was an expert at instructing subterfuges and expedients for the accused. The explanation sounds anything but original, mirroring the secular discussions of jurists on this issue. Also the provisions of laws and statutes had always considered the too long speeches and dilatory tactics of the defenders as the cause of the excessive duration of the trials[21]. Thus, the body of law, which aimed to unify the criminal procedure in the Empire, proposed the same solution that the local bodies of laws to be replaced had proposed: entrusting the judge with the duty to search for pro reo elements, giving him the triple role of judge, prosecutor and defender of the accused (Richter, Klager und Unschuld-Vertheidigung), typical of the Austrian criminal procedure[22]. However, it was the way the defence of the accused was practised to be discussed, not the defence itself, because this was a prerogative that had been recognized de iure naturali and divino since the days of the ius commune[23]. Indeed, everyone was entitled to this faculty, even the devil if he took part in a trial, as exemplified since the 13th century[24] with a hyperbole that «tota schola docet» still in the 18th century[25].

The disapproval of the presence of a defender at all or only in some stages of the criminal trial is nevertheless a phenomenon that can be found in other important bodies of laws since the 16th century and also outside the extensive imperial borders, albeit with mixed success in their effective use: for example, the French Ordonnance of Villers-Cotterêts of 1539, the Dutch Ordonnantiën of 1570[26] and the French Ordonnance criminelle of 1670[27].

Precluding the intervention of a defending counsel in such a way was a choice that did not emerge in the Carolina that, notwithstanding its unbinding nature, constituted the criminal common law, model of all the bodies of laws regarding criminal law in German-speaking territories – including the Ferdinandea, the Josephina[28] and hence the Theresiana[29] – and reference for judges and legal scholars for a very lengthy period (even up to the first half of the 19th century)[30]. Thus, it has been possible to say that Austrian procedural law was only a branch of the evolution of German procedural law[31], and that the target of an at least formal detachment of Austrian criminal law from German criminal law was probably reached for the first time only by the Theresiana itself[32].

Indeed, there were several provisions in the Carolina that seemed to open «qualche spiraglio alla difesa»[33] (some possibilities of the defence). The effective practice of the defence is not to be searched in Article 88, entitled Von Fürsprechen (an old German word indicating the speakers in favour of a trial party[34]): indeed, it referred to the judgment day (the entliche Rechtstag), when the procedural dialectics between those who accused and those who defended were a homage to tradition within the ceremonies and spectacular settings that represented an already written verdict. The presence of the pleader of the accused, even chosen from among the Schöffen part of the court, had a merely ritual meaning, as it is clear by the fact that he was obliged to read a form provided for the purpose, which precluded him from playing an active role[35].

It was mainly in Articles 47 and 73 that the legal scholars studying the Carolina till the late 18th century (the large number of commentaries written about it for many years is the best example for the continuation of such a model[36]) tried to find the principles to protect the defendant. The former provided for the judge to urge the accused to produce facts in his justification, by himself or with the help of a person he trusted (Freund), before the instruments of torture entered the scene; then, these facts had to be carefully checked by the judge[37]. The latter allowed the communication of copy of the testimonies to a pleader (Sachwalther) and to the accused in prison after the pubblicatio processus; the accused was also granted the possibility to have an interview with somebody who could help him (Beistender)[38].

The Latin translations of the Carolina made between the 16th and the 17th century by Justinus Gobler and Georg Remus – who was author of a paraphrase, which enriched the German text in a certain number of cases – tried to define more precisely the vagueness of these rules[39]. They did not provide important novelties about Article 47 – the former spoke about the intervention of propinqui, the latter of agnati – even if Remus justified the aid of a third party by the common inability of the accused to plead for himself perite et prompte. This way, though, he let believe that it was necessary to contact someone who could extricate himself skilfully among the insidious mechanisms of the trial in order to have an intervention characterized by experience and rapidity[40].

On the contrary, the translation of Article 73 was more interesting. Gobler gave an advocatus both the possibility to receive a copy of the evidence and to meet the accused, while Remus, this time perhaps more faithful to the text, seemed to distinguish the different situations, referring the communication of the testimonies «ad eos quod interest» and the interview to the person providing his patronage to the accused[41]. In neither case, however, we can say that they were necessarily referring to technical defenders, although there was an attempt to refine the vocabulary.

Almost a century after the enacting of the Carolina, Matthias Stephani proposed a summa of the same articles that was identical to Remus’s version in many parts. On the one hand, he founded on the ratio pietatis the support that the judge had to give to rusticiores, adolescentes and mulierculae, also with the indications of a defender. On the other hand, he founded the reasons for the tools and the moments dedicated to the defence on the necessity to avoid a different treatment between the accused and the accuser[42].

Not even a decade later, Benedict Carpzov, who was not a direct commentator of the Carolina, but one of the greatest and most quoted authorities on criminal law of the time, so much so that he was considered the German Bartolus[43], in his monumental work on Saxon law included the aid of a person among the instruments available for the accused to prepare his defence[44]. Also in this case, however, it does not seem that the role necessarily had to be covered by a jurist, since he merely mentioned relatives among those who could give their support to the accused, as in the letter of Article 47 C.C.C.[45]. When Carpzov expressly dealt with the advocati, he focused on their very strict moral standards, without which they «ipsius diaboli sunt mancipia»: they should be experts in law, as can be deduced by the blame he addressed towards the habit – deemed as ridiculous – they had to argue quoting the Corpus iuris and the doctores in order to influence the decision of the judge, «ac si aegrotus medico curam praescribere vellet ex Galeno, Hippocrate et aliis». Saxon law tried to correct this inconvenience by banning the accused and his lawyer from having the copy of evidence, thus limiting the lengthening of the duration of the trial, which was unacceptable in that it was «contra naturam istius processus»[46].

Johann Brunnemann in the same years schematically explained his ideas on the issue in his treatise on the criminal trial: granting the defence to the accused before the torture, also by means of the aid of another person, was always necessary, even in case it had not been requested or there had already been a confession by the defendant. Indeed, this way the judge was saved from being responsible for not respecting the procedures and also the nullity of the whole trial was prevented. The delivery of a copy of the circumstantial evidence was the fundamental condition of effective exercise of the defence, as was the interview with the lawyer. Nevertheless, Brunnemann warned against the fraudulent behaviours of lawyers, for which he proposed to choose him from among the Schöffen, as suggested by the Carolina – but this custom fell into disuse[47] – and in any case to make sure that he was pious and honest or bound by oath. Furthermore, the doctores proposed to make the interview with the accused under surveillance. Finally, the duration of the trial could also be controlled, since the original proceedings could be examined in judicii loco, thus saving copying time[48].

A few years later (in 1650), Caspar Manz held that the defence was effectively carried out if the circumstantial evidence against the accused was communicated to him (notwithstanding the prevision of a large number of exceptions to this principle). Manz claimed to have personally witnessed the practice of granting an advocatus to the defendant not only at his explicit request, but also ex officio, since «hoc spectat ad defensionem, quae iuris naturalis est»[49]. The real situation remained very uncertain, since it was left to the considerations of the legal scholars and to the judicial practice of the courts. However, there were correctives and indispensable limits to this option, made necessary according to Manz by the conduct often followed by defending counsels that «omnia mala norunt, et aliqui modicae sunt conscientiae»: a traditional cautela corresponded to these traditional criticisms, i.e. lawyers should have to swear not to obstruct the course of justice and even to abandon the defence if they realized the culpability of the accused[50]. Manz thought that the oath could be the solution also for the problems concerning the interview between the lawyer and the defendant: if he swore to behave properly, the interview could be held without anyone from the court keeping watch on them. This moment was very important, since the accused was often ignorant and needed the help of an expert in law to whom he had the necessity to speak without restraint in order to learn the best way to face the charges against him. If the freedom of speech was limited or denied, the defence itself was limited or denied. However, the point of view of Manz met opposition in his time[51].

Twenty years later, Christoph Blumblacher indicated how it was customary to grant a lawyer to the defendant, but he did not consider it necessary. Indeed, the defence itself was essential to the trial, but the lawyer constituted only one way of exercising the rights of the defence, as suggested by the ratio of Article 47: according to the circumstances, the defence could be circumscribed by the judge, especially when considering that the malicious behaviour of the pleaders was an obstacle to justice and a delay of the trial[52].

Therefore, the legal scholars studying the Carolina justified the presence of the defender in the trial, but at the same time seemed to oppose it, since he was seen above all as an obstacle to the rapidity and effectiveness of the inquisitio. Thus, they limited his leeway: in addition to the lawyer’s expertise, on the one hand they made old recommendations, as Daniel Clasen did, who warned a lawyer to plea an accused only if innocent[53], on the other hand they prescribed the lawyer a huge number of moral requirements[54].

This way, the development of a literature dedicated to the more general problem of the defence[55], or one concerning the role of the defending counsel in the criminal trial[56], was favoured. These kinds of works focused particularly on the enumeration of the moral features that a defender must have to do his job, since they were deemed as a guarantee against every hindrance to the smooth running of the trial. Johann David Thönnicker’s work of the early 18th century can be numbered among these. He made recommendations on conduct of the lawyer based on well-known stereotypes, albeit in a watered-down form with respect to those in similar works. Nevertheless, he asserted that producing the usual excuses in order to refuse the accused a lawyer – i.e. the risk of lengthening trial time, increasing costs, the clarity and simplicity of the case, the confession already obtained or the conduction of the trial in a conscientious way by the judge – could indicate bad faith because it meant excluding in fact the primary available means of defence[57].

Over time, the granting of the defence (even ex officio), starting from the phase immediately before the torture, by means of the granting of a professional defender (a Rechtsgelehrter, a person who had sufficient technical-juridical preparation), who would have contributed with his experience to the trial, were agreed upon (albeit with caution) by legal scholars[58]. The ante quaestionem presence of the defender, who must know the circumstantial evidence speciatim in order to oppose it effectively, was left to the judge’s discretion, though jurists seemed to prefer this option[59]. As always, large gaps remained in which arbitrium and interpretation may have entered. Heinrich Meier spoke – unheeded – against the discretion of the judge and the fact that he assumed both the prerogatives of the prosecutor and of the defender; this way «facile confunditur»: the inquisitorial trial lacked acontradictor to balance the prerogatives of the judge and could be represented by a professional defender[60].

Johann Samuel Friedrich Böhmer, whose early work on criminal law, based on the Carolina, was considered the first scientifically significant manual of common German criminal law and in particular of the criminal procedure[61], laid down the most traditional positions of the doctrines developed until then. For this reason, it was one of the main sources (sometimes copied almost literally) used by Banniza senior, who in Austria was in fact the mediator of his thought. The Theresiana itself later drew from many points of the system, which was described there[62]. Whatever the crime, Böhmer found it difficult that the accused could be denied defence, insomuch as that sometimes it was prepared ex officio. The defender – whoever he was: the defendant himself, one of his relatives, a third party or the judge – must have the instruments to properly prepare his work, of which most notably were having an interview with the accused and being able to read a copy of the circumstantial evidence. Though, these activities were often opposed because they delayed the progress of the trial[63]. This was nothing new, including a reference to the risk of lengthy litigations, a real obsession for all jurists, who always found one culprit, i.e. the captious lawyer.

When in 1770 the more mature Böhmer approached the Carolina to write a commentary, more severe judgments replaced simple descriptions. Indeed, he started from the premise that in every step of the trial potentially prejudicial for the accused, he should have the opportunity to defend himself. However, then he focused in particular on what was set forth by the judge in defence of the accused, since the inquiry he conducted was guided by the aim to get the truth. The custom of appointing a defender was not justified with the risk of not having the necessary impartiality by the judge, but rather with the risk of too many commitments for which he was overburdened, due to the overlapping of his duties. On the contrary, intervention of lawyers in the trial should be limited to avoid abuses by them. In any case, Böhmer reiterated that there were no written rules in the Carolina expressly providing for the intervention of the defender, but any question regarding him was left to the discretion of the judge. However, if the case presented difficulties against which the accused would have rarely been able to prepare an adequate defence, a defending counsel was then necessary, who could become informed on the proceedings, preferably in their original format and under the surveillance of a judicial officer to prevent tampering of the documents[64]. The distrust of lawyers remained, even when it seemed that there were some possibilities for their intervention.

The criminal law scholars from the German area, therefore, starting from the text of the Carolina, through constant interpretation (which began with its versions in Latin), laid the foundation of a practice that gave some space to the figure of the defender, first leaving undefined contours, then connoting him with increasing precision as an expert in law. The pages of these authors, however, were filled with repeated interventions and recommendations regarding the conduct and the necessary moral prerequisites lawyers should have, as if they actually abused the limited opportunities given to them. Indeed, this seemed to justify the invectives that painted them as greedy swindlers and manipulators, who sneaked around diabolically in the dangerous bottlenecks of the trial: for this reason the risk was still there, noted with concern also in the Josephina and in the Theresiana, that their intervention, characterized by sophistry and attempts of procrastination, created disorder in the inquisition.

Thus, the shift from the precarious and uncertain opening towards lawyers by legal scholars to the limits set since the 17th century by the Austrian bodies of laws was nearly natural. These criminal laws included the prohibition of the defender, strengthened in their choice also by the widespread belief that the trial was the tool used by the judge to achieve the truth; the possible innocence of the defendant could emerge through the work of this man; if the accused was guilty, the intervention of a defender would have proved useless anyway. The problem of finding someone who practiced law and did not obstruct quick and effective justice, aimed at finding a culprit, was solved with the entrusting of all the duties to the judge (who above all became judge of himself and of his work)[65]. This way, the asymmetric dynamics of the absolute State were reproduced on a small scale, in which the subject was unarmed and helpless before the power[66].

One can therefore assume that the holder of the truth worked in the interest of the defendant and of justice better than the lawyer, who on the contrary aimed to obscure the facts. In the opposition – almost biblical – between a judge who was one and trine and a lawyer who took the place of the devil, in the battle between angels and demons, the pious Austrian legislator of the second half of the 18th century, supported by a strong tradition and by old-century considerations of legal scholars, did not have (nor could he have) doubts on which mala herba to eradicate.

[1] J.P. Banniza, Systema jurisprudentiae criminalis, Viennae 1763 (first edition 1755), c. 11, § 5, pp. 107-108. About Johann Peter Banniza (1707-1775) see C. v. Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich, 1, Wien 1856, pp. 146-147; J.F. v. Schulte, Banniza, Johann Peter, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 2, Leipzig 1875, p. 42; E. Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 3.1, Noten, München-Leipzig 1898, p. 190; H. Banniza, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Geschlechter Banniza/Panizza, in Deutsches Familienarchiv, 32, Neustadt an der Aisch 1966, pp. 220-290, pp. 265-266, 269-273; H. Lentze, Banniza, Johann Peter, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, A. Erler – E. Kauffman (ed.), mitbegründet von W. Stammler, 1, Berlin 1971, coll. 312-313.

[2] Cf. the Praefamen of his work by Banniza himself and the contemporary review in «Wienerischen gelehrten Nachrichten» del 1755, XI, cited by Leben und Schriften Herrn Johann Peter von Banniza, Erlangen 1756, p. 29.

[3] Neue peinliche Landgerichts-Ordnung in Oesterreich unter der Ennß (Ferdinandea), art. 20, consulted in the Viennese edition of 1678 printed by Johann Jacob Kürner and in the Latin translation entitled Forma processus judicii criminalis seu Praxis criminalis (Tyrnaviae, Typis Academicis per Joannem Andream Hörmann, 1697). The German text of the Ferdinandea is also in Codex Austriacus, 1, Wienn 1704, pp. 659-728.

[4] This is the thought of F.J. Bratsch, Über … Land-Gerichts-Ordnung in Oesterreich unter der Enns, Wien 1751, p. 41. On the erudite and anything but original comment on the Ferdinandea by Bratsch, see H. Hoegel, Geschichte des Österreichischen Strafrechtes in Verbindung mit einer Erläuterung seiner grundsätzlichen Bestimmungen, 1, Wien 1904, p. 45, and F. Hartl, Grundlinien der österreichischen Strafrechtsgeschichte bis zur Revolution von 1848, in Die Entwicklung der österreichisch-ungarischen Strafrechtskodifikation im XIX-XX. Jahrhundert, G. Máthé – W. Ogris (ed.), Budapest 1996, pp. 13-54, p. 14.

[5] J.L. Banniza, Delineatio juris criminalis, II, Oeniponti 1773, c. 8, § 110, p. 51. About Joseph Leonhard Banniza (1733-1800) see Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon, cit. (note 1), pp. 146-147; E.J.H. Steffenhagen,Banniza, Joseph Leonhard, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 2, Leipzig 1875, p. 42; A. v. Wretschko, Die Geschichte der Juristischen Fakultät an der Universität Innsbruck (1671-1904), Innsbruck 1904, p. 23; E. Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 3.1, Text, München-Leipzig 1898, p. 400; Banniza,Beiträge zur Geschichte, cit. (note 1), pp. 273-276; R. Moos, Der Verbrechensbegriff in Österreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Sinn- und Strukturwandel, Bonn 1968, pp. 105-107; H. Lentze, Banniza, Joseph Leonhard, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 1, cit. (note 1), coll. 313-314; G. Oberkofler, Joseph Leonard Banniza, in Juristen in Österreich 1200-1980, W. Brauneder (ed.), Wien 1987, pp. 108-109.

[6] About the work of Banniza junior see, for example, A. Giarda, “Persistendo ‘l reo nella negativa”, Milano 1980, p. 69.

[7] Cf. M.G. di Renzo Villata, Giuristi, cultura giuridica e idee di riforma nell’età di Beccaria, inCesare Beccaria tra Milano e l’Europa, Milano 1990, pp. 225-278, p. 246; E. Dezza,Tommaso Nani e la dottrina dell’indizio nell’età dei Lumi, Milano 1992, p. 136; S. Solimano, Paolo Risi e il processo penale (1766), in Studi di storia del diritto, 3, Milano 2001, pp. 419-519, pp. 441-442 and note 70, 495.

[8] Lentze, Banniza, Johann Peter, cit. (note 1), col. 313; Id., Banniza, Joseph Leonhard, cit. (note 5), col. 313.

[9] About the political meaning of the Habsburg legislations in the second half of the 18th century see H. Baltl, Österreichische Rechtsgeschichte. Von den Anfänge bis zur Gegenwart, Graz 19794, pp. 165, 207-208; W. Ogris, Maria Theresia und die Entfaltung des Absolutismus in Österreich, in Diritto e potere nella storia europea. Atti in onore di B. Paradisi, 2, Firenze 1982, pp. 867-881, p. 879. The legislative unification promoted by the Theresiana was only partially successful. Indeed, it was in force in the hereditary countries and in Bohemia, but not in Hungary, as initially provided for: H. Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 2, Neuzeit bis 1806, Karlsruhe 1966, p. 427; R. Hoke, Österreichische und deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Wien 19962, p. 240.

[10] The text of the Leopoldina copied the Ferdinandea (Hoegel, Geschichte, cit. [note 4], p. 45), as indicated in Codex Austriacus, cit. (note 3), p. 729.

[11] Consulted in the edition printed in Freiburg by Martin Parcus in 1711.

[12] The Theresiana has been consulted in the 1769 Viennese edition printed by Trattnern and in the official Italian translation (about its date see E. Dezza, Il divieto della difesa tecnica nell’Allgemeine Kriminalgerichtsordnung (1788), in Codice Generale Austriaco dei delitti e delle pene (1787), ristampa anastatica, con scritti di M.A. Cattaneo, G. Chiodi, F. Colao, E. Dezza, R. Ferrante, L. Garlati Giugni, M.N. Miletti, S. Solimano, G. Vinciguerra, S. Vinciguerra, raccolti da S. Vinciguerra, Padova 2005, pp. CXCVII-CCXIV, with some modifications also in «Acta Histriae», 15.1 (2007), pp. 303-320, and in Regolamento generale austriaco della procedura criminale (1788), ristampa anastatica, con scritti di D. Brunelli, C. Carcereri De Prati, E. Dezza, M.G. di Renzo Villata, P. Ferrua, L. Garlati, A. Manna, M.N. Miletti, P. Pittaro, S. Vinciguerra, raccolti da S. Vinciguerra, Padova 2012, pp. LXXIX-XCVI, p. CCXII, note 37, and Id., Il nemico della verità. Divieto di difesa tecnica e giudice factotum nella codificazione penale asburgica (1768-1873), in Riti, tecniche, interessi. Il processo penale tra Otto e Novecento, M.N. Miletti (ed.), Milano 2006, pp. 13-77, p. 27, note 27). Cf. A. Domin-Petrushevecz,Neuere österreichische Rechtsgeschichte, Wien 1869, pp. 52-53; E. v. Kwiatkowski, Die Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana. Ein Beitrag zur theresianischen Reichs- und Rechtsgeschichte, Innsbruck 1903, pp. 15-19; W. Brauneder, Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, begründet von W. Stammler, A. Erler und E. Kaufmann, A. Cordes – H. Luck – D. Werkmüller (ed.), unter philologischer Mitarbeit von R. Schmidt-Wiegand, 2. völlig überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, 1, Berlin 2004-2008, coll. 890-891, col. 890.

[13] Art. 36, §§ 10-11 CCT. Cf. Domin-Petrushevecz, Neuere österreichische Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 12), p. 70; Hartl, Grundlinien, cit. (note 4), pp. 18 and 21; Dezza, Il divieto, cit. (note 12), p. CCXIII; Id., Il nemico della verità, cit. (note 12), pp. 26-29.

[14] H. Conrad, Zu den geistigen Grundlagen der Strafrechtsreform Josephs II. (1780-1788), in Festschrift für H. v. Weber zum 70. Geburtstag, H. Welzel – H. Conrad – A Kaufmann – H. Kaufmann (ed.), Bonn 1963, pp. 56-74, p. 56; Id., Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 2, cit. (note 9), p. 427; Hoke, Österreichische und deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 9), p. 241, 430; Dezza, Il divieto, cit. (note 12), p. CCXIII; K. Bruckmüller, Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana, in Rechtsgeschichte und römisches Recht. Studienwörterbuch, T. Olechowski – R. Gamauf (ed.), Wien 20102, p. 74.

[15] These are the judgments by A. Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa. Le fonti e il pensiero giuridico, 2, Milano 2005, p. 293, and by F. Cordero, Criminalia. Nascita dei sistemi penali, Roma-Bari 1986, p. 539. See also A. Cavanna,La codificazione penale in Italia. Le origini lombarde, Milano 1975, p. 42; Id.,La codificazione del diritto nella Lombardia austriaca, in Economia, istituzioni, cultura in Lombardia nell’età di Maria Teresa, A. De Maddalena – E. Rotelli – G. Barbarisi (ed.), 3, Bologna 1982, pp. 611-657, also in Id., Scritti (1968-2002), 1, Napoli 2007, pp. 463-512, p. 483; Ogris, Maria Theresia, cit. (note 9), p. 879.

[16] Cf. Cavanna, La codificazione del diritto, cit. (note 15), p. 497; G. Provin, Una riforma per la Lombardia dei Lumi. Tradizione e novità nella “Norma interinale del processo criminale”, Milano 1990, pp. 79-82; Dezza, Il nemico della verità, cit. (note 12), pp. 31-32; Id., Lezioni di storia del processo penale, Pavia 2013, p. 115.

[17] Cf. J.F. Henschel, Die Strafverteidigung im Inquisitionsprozeß des 18. und im Anklageprozeß des 19. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg im Breisgau 1972, pp. 32-36; Hoke, Österreichische und deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 9), p. 433; A. Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto e ragioni del potere nel Codice penale austriaco del 1803, in Codice penale universale austriaco (1803), con scritti di S. Ambrosio, A. Cadoppi, C. Carcereri De Prati, M.A. Cattaneo, A. Cavanna, M. Da Passano, P. De Zan, E. Dezza, P. Pittaro, P. Rondini, S. Tschigg, S. Vinciguerra, raccolti da S. Vinciguerra, Padova 2001, pp. CCXIX-CCLXV , also in Id., Scritti (1968-2002), 2, Napoli 2007, pp. 1137-1184, p. CCXL; E. Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione. Processo penale, assolutismo e garantismo nel codice asburgico del 1803, ivi, pp. CLV-CLXXXIII, also in Id., Saggi di storia del processo penale nell’età della codificazione, Padova 2001, pp. 141-169, pp. 144-146, 151; Id., Il divieto, cit. (note 12), pp. CCXI-CCXIII; Id., Il nemico della verità, cit. (note 12), pp. 18-31, 73-75; M.N. Miletti, «Per quali vie convenga investigare la verità». L’opzione inquisitoria nella Kriminalgerichtsordnung del 1788, in Regolamento generale austriaco, cit. (note 12), pp. LIII-LXXVIII, p. LXXI-LXXII.

[18] Domin-Petrushevecz, Neuere österreichische Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 12), p. 55; W.E. Wahlberg,Forschungen zur Geschichte der alt-österreichischen Strafgesetzgebung, Wien 1881, p. 6; Kwiatkowski, Die Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana, cit. (note 12), pp. 21-24, 136-137; Hoegel, Geschichte, cit. (note 4), pp. 65-66; Conrad, Zu den geistigen Grundlagen, cit. (note 14), pp. 56-57; F. Hartl, Das Wiener Kriminalgericht. Strafrechtspflege von Zeitalter der Aufklärung bis zur österreichischen Revolution, Wien-Köln-Graz 1973, pp. 20-21; Id., Grundlinien, cit. (note 4), p. 18; W. Hülle, Theresiana, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, A. Erler – E. Kauffman – D. Werkmüller (ed.), unter philologischer Mitarbeit von R. Schmidt-Wiegand, mitbegründet von W. Stammler, 5, Berlin 1998, coll. 173-175, col. 173.

[19] Josephina , art. 12, § 1, e CCT, art. 36, § 5. Suggestions from the Ferdinandea seem to be also in the provisions about the extent of the leeway of the defender in the rare case he was admitted: indeed, the text of Ferdinandea, art. 20, § 1 and the text of CCT, art. 36, § 12, are very similar.

[20] Cf. Cavanna, Ragioni del diritto, cit. (note 17), p. CCLIV.

[21] Cf. P. Fiorelli, Avvocato (diritto romano e intermedio), in Enciclopedia del Diritto, 4, Milano 1959, pp. 646-649, p. 648; Dezza, Il nemico della verità, cit. (note 12), pp. 70-71; R. Bianchi Riva, L’avvocato non difenda cause ingiuste. Ricerche sulla deontologia forense in età medievale e moderna, 1, Il medioevo, Milano 2012, pp. 38-42, 48.

[22] Cf. Josephina, art. 1, § 2, e CCT, art. 36, § 6. On this matter see Domin-Petrushevecz, Neuere österreichische Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 12), p. 56, and W. Gleispach, Das österreichische Strafverfahren, Wien 1924, p. 8. Cf. also Dezza, L’impossibile conciliazione, cit. (note 17), p. 151. According to Hoke, Österreichische und deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 9), p. 428, gathering every role in the judge means that the accused was object and not subject in the criminal trial.

[23] See E. Dezza, L’avvocato nella storia del processo penale, in Un progetto di ricerca sulla storia dell’avvocatura, G. Alpa – R. Da Novi (ed.), Bologna 2003, pp. 111-134, p. 114; Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), p. 133; O. Condorelli, «Ius» e «lex» nel sistema del diritto comune (secoli XIV-XV), in Lex und Ius. Beiträge zur Begründung des Rechts in der Philisophie des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit, A. Fidora – M. Lutz-Bachmann – A. Wagner (ed.), Stuttgart 2010, pp. 27-88, pp. 53-60.

[24] See Henricus de Segusio, Summa, Lugduni 1537, ad X. 2.25, de exceptionibus, n. 3, fol. 257va, and G. Durantis, Speculum iudiciale, Lugduni 1531, lib. 3, de inquisitione, § ultimo nota, n. 6, fol. 23va. See C. Gallagher, Canon Law and the Christian Community. The Role of Law in the Church According to the Summa Aurea of Cardinal Hostiensis, Roma 1978, p. 160; K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600. Sovereignity and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1993, p. 163; Id., Due Process, Community, and the Prince in the Evolution of the Ordo iudiciarius, in «Rivista internazionale di diritto comune», 9 (1998), pp. 9-47, pp. 36, 46.

[25] J.G. Reinmann, De edendis a iudice actis ad formandam defensionem pro avertenda inquisitione, Erfordiae 1721, c. 3, § 1, p. 13.

[26] See, for example, L.-T. Maes, Die drei großen europäischen Strafgesetzbücher des 16. Jahrhunderts. Eine vergleichende Studie, in «Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung», 94 (1977), pp. 207-217, p. 216; A. Allard,Histoire de la justice criminelle au seizième siècle, Gand-Leipzig-Paris 1986, pp. 228-234; E. Dezza, “Pour pourvoir au bien de notre justice”. Legislazioni statali, processo penale e modulo inquisitorio nell’Europa del XVI secolo, in «Diritto penale XXI secolo», 1 (2002), pp. 159-202, also in «Acta Histriae», 10.1 (2002), pp. 7-38, p. 13 (the prohibition of professional defence was most likely already implicit in the extraordinary procedure illustrated in the Ordonnance of Blois of 1498); Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), p. 35; J.-M. Carbasse, Histoire du droit pénal et de la justice criminelle, Paris 20062, p. 207.

[27] See, for example, A. Esmein, Histoire de la procédure criminelle en France et spécialement de la procédure inquisitoire, depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu’à nos jours , Paris 1882, pp. 231-234; R. Martucci,Il modulo inquisitorio nelle «ordonnances» francesi da Colbert alla Costituente, in Le politiche criminali nel XVIII secolo, L. Berlinguer – F. Colao (ed.), Milano 1990, pp. 233-313, pp. 250-253; J.-P. Royer, Histoire de la justice en France. De la monarchie absolue à la République, Paris 19962, p. 36; A. Laingui, Introduction to Code Louis. T. II. Ordonnance criminelle, 1670, Milano 1996, pp. VII-XXV, p. XIX and note 20; Carbasse, Histoire du droit pénal, cit. (note 26), p. 211; Dezza, Il nemico della verità, cit. (note 12), pp. 62-68; A. Astaing, Droits et garanties de l’accusé dans le procès criminel d’Ancien Régime (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles). Audace et pusillanimité de la doctrine pénale française , Aix-en-Provence 1999, pp. 110-122; M.-Y. Crépin, Ordonnance criminelle dite de Saint-Germain-en-Laye, août 1670, in La procédure et la construction de l’État en Europe XVIe-XIXe siècle. Recueil de textes, présentés et commentés , J. Hautebert – S. Soleil (ed.), Rennes 2011, pp. 449-462, pp. 456-457.

[28] Domin-Petrushevecz, Neuere österreichische Rechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 12), p. 27; Kwiatkowski, Die Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana, cit. (note 12), pp. 15-16; Hoegel, Geschichte, cit. (note 4), p. 59; Gleispach, Das österreichische Strafverfahren, cit. (note 22), p. 7; Moos, Der Verbrechensbegriff, cit. (note 5), p. 110, note 115; Hartl, Das Wiener Kriminalgericht, cit. (note 18), p. 18; Id., Grundlinien, cit. (note 4), p. 14; Bruckmüller, Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana, cit. (note 14), p. 142.

[29] Conrad, Zu den geistigen Grundlagen, cit. (note 14), p. 57; Id., Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 2, cit. (note 9), p. 427; H. Liebel-Weckowicz,Auf der Suche nach neuer Autorität: Raison d’État in den Verwaltungs- und Rechtsreformen Maria Theresias und Josephs II., in Österreich im Europa der Aufklärung. Kontinuität und Zäsur in Europa zur Zeit Maria Theresias und Josephs II., Wien 1985, pp. 339-364, p. 360; Hülle, Theresiana, cit. (note 18), col. 173; R. Lieberwirth, Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte2, 1, cit. (note 12), coll. 885-890, col. 889.

[30] E. Schmidt, Die Carolina. Ein Vortrag, in «Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung», 53 (1933), pp. 1-34, p. 10; Id., Einführung in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, Göttingen 19653, pp. 141-143; G. Schmidt, Sinn und Bedeutung der Constitutio Criminalis Carolina als Ordnung des materiellen und prozessualen Rechts, in «Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung», 83 (1966), pp. 239-257, p. 255; J.H. Langbein,Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance. England, Germany, France, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1974, pp. 140, 166; Maes,Die drei großen europäischen Strafgesetzbücher, cit. (note 26), pp. 207-208; G. Kleinheyer,Tradition und Reform in der Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, in Strafrecht, Strafprozess und Rezeption. Grundlagen, Entwicklung und Wirkung der Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, P. Landau – F.-C. Schroeder (ed.), Frankfurt am Main 1984, pp. 7-27, pp. 9, 26; Lieberwirth, Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, cit. (note 29), col. 889; A. Astaing – H. Henrion, Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, 1532, inLa procédure et la construction de l’État, cit. (note 27), pp. 375-422, pp. 381-382; C. Camby, Criminal-Ordnung, 8 juillet 1717, ivi, pp. 463-505, p. 468.

[31] Gleispach, Das österreichische Strafverfahren, cit. (note 22), p. 6.

[32] Hülle, Theresiana, cit. (note 18), col. 175.

[33] E. Dezza, Accusa e inquisizione dal diritto comune ai codici moderni, Milano 1989, p. 95, note 142; Id., Pour pourvoir au bien de notre justice, cit. (note 26), p. 20; Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), p. 43. See also Astaing – Henrion, Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, cit. (note 30), p. 380. U. Falk, Zur Geschichte der Strafverteidigung. Aktuelle Beobachtungeng und rechtshistorische Grundlagen, in «Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung», 117 (2000), pp. 395-449, p. 433, admits the existence and a certain effectiveness of defence in criminal trials between the 16th and the 18th century.

[34] The term was usually translated with the Latin word procurator, but it is interesting that J.H. Böhmer,De potestate procuratoris in causis criminalibus, Halae Magdeburgicae 1726, § 27, p. 47, and K.F. Walch,Glossarium germanicum interpretationi Constitutionis Carolinae inserviens, Ienae 1790, p. 295, explained it using only advocatus. See H. Winterberg, Fürsprecher, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 1, cit. (note 1), coll. 1333-1336; P. Oestmann, Fürsprecher, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte 2, 1, cit. (note 12), coll. 1883-1887.

[35] Cf. Henschel, Die Strafverteidigung, cit. (note 17), pp. 7, 14-17; Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, cit. (note 30), pp. 189-192; Kleinheyer, Tradition und Reform, cit. (note 30), pp. 11-12, 19-21; W. Schild, Der “entliche Rechtstag” als das Theater des Rechts, in Strafrecht, Strafprozess und Rezeption, cit. (note 30), pp. 119-144; W. Sellert, Studien- und Quellenbuch zur Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, 1,Von den Anfängen bis zur Aufklärung, Aalen 1989, pp. 209-210; G. Alessi, Il processo penale. Profilo storico, Milano-Bari 2001, p. 71; Dezza, Pour pourvoir au bien de notre justice, cit. (note 26), pp. 23-24; Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), p. 46.

[36] P. Fiorelli, La tortura giudiziaria nel diritto comune, 1, Milano 1953, p. 108, note 48; Schmidt,Sinn und Bedeutung, cit. (note 30), pp. 255-256; H. Rüping, Die Carolina in der strafrechtlichen Kommentarliteratur. Zur Verhältnis von Gesetz und Wissenschaft im gemeinem deutschen Strafrecht, in Strafrecht, Strafprozess und Rezeption, cit. (note 30), pp. 161-176, pp. 163-165.

[37] See Esmein, Histoire de la procédure criminelle, cit. (note 27), p. 309; Henschel, Die Strafverteidigung, cit. (note 17), pp. 13-14, 21; Rüping, Die Carolina, cit. (note 36), pp. 168-169; Dezza, Pour pourvoir au bien de notre justice, cit. (note 26), p. 22; Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), p. 45.

[38] See Henschel, Die Strafverteidigung, cit. (note 17), pp. 19-20; A. Roth, Strafverteidigung, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 5, cit. (note 18), coll. 6-9, col. 7.

[39] The Latin translation by J. Gobler (1543) and the paraphrase in Latin by G. Remus (1618) are both in J.F.H. Abegg (ed. Heidelberg 1837). About Justinus Gobler (1504-1569) see R. v. Stintzing, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 1, München-Leipzig 1880, pp. 582-585; H.E. Troje, Gobler, Justin, inHandwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 1, cit. (note 1), coll. 1726-1728. About Georg Remus (1561-1625) see Stintzing, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 1, cit., pp. 636-637. The first clarifications of the Carolina were composed by judges and consultants (just as Gobler and Remus). They were not real commentaries, but lexical explanations of the text, translated in Latin, of little scientific worth: F. Schaffstein, Die allgemeinen Lehren vom Verbrechen in ihrer Entwicklung durch die Wissenschaft des gemeinen Strafrechts, Berlin 1930, pp. 7-8; Rüping, Die Carolina, cit. (note 36), p. 166; H. Schlosser,Tiberio Deciano ed il suo influsso sulla scienza penalistica tedesca, in Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Alle origini del pensiero giuridico moderno, M. Cavina (ed.), Udine 2004, pp. 121-137, pp. 127-128; Id., Neuere Europäische Rechtsgeschichte. Privat- und Strafrecht vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne, München 2012, p. 99.

[40] Remi paraphrasis, cit. (note 39), p. 67.

[41] Remi paraphrasis, cit. (note 39), p. 89. Walch, Glossarium, cit. (note 34), pp. 203-206, 430-431, approved the translation of Remus: it was more relevant to the historical context to which the Carolina referred to, since it was general.

[42] M. Stephani, Caroli Quinti … Constitutiones publicorum iudiciorum, cum jure communi collatae, Francofurti 1626, ad art. 47, p. 111; ad art. 73, n. 1, p. 148. The vocabulary used by Stephani could induce to think that Article 73 referred to the accusatorial procedure, as explicitly emphasized by some succeeding commentators of the Carolina (for example, see J.F. Ludovici, Caroli quinti … constitutiones criminales, Halae Magdeburgicae 1707, ad art. 73, p. 68; G. Beyer, Delineatio iuris criminalis secundum Constitutionem Carolinam, Lipsiae 1737 [first edition 1714], ad art. 73, p. 135; J.S.F. Böhmer, Meditationes in Constitutionem Criminalem Carolinam, Halae Magdeburgicae 1774 [first edition 1770], ad art. 73, § 1, p. 268; Walch, Glossarium, cit. [note 34], p. 205). About Matthias Stephani (1576-1646) see A. v. Eisenhart, Stephani, Mathias, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 36, Leipzig 1893, p. 95.

[43] A. Cavanna, Storia del diritto moderno in Europa. Le fonti e il pensiero giuridico, 1, Milano 1982, pp. 465-466. About Carpzov and the Carolina see Schmidt, Sinn und Bedeutung, cit. (note 30), p. 254.

[44] B. Carpzov, Practica Nova Imperialis Saxonica Rerum Criminalium, 3, Wittebergae 1670 (first edition 1635), q. 105, nn. 23-24, p. 37. About Benedict Carpzov (1595-1666) the bibliography is very wide: for example, see T. Muther,Carpzov, Benedict, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 4, Leipzig 1876, pp. 11-20; R. von Stintzing, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 2, München-Leipzig 1884, pp. 55-100; H. v. Weber, Benedict Carpzov. Ein Bild der deutschen Rechtspflege im Barockzeitalter, inFestschrift für E.H. Rosenfeld zu seinem 80. Geburtstag am 14. August 1949, Berlin 1949, pp. 29-50; E. Döhring, Carpzov, Benedict, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, 3 (1957), pp. 156-157; Schmidt, Einführung, cit. (note 30), pp. 153-157; F. Wieacker,Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung, Göttingen 1967, trad. ital. Storia del diritto privato moderno con particolare riguardo alla Germania, U. Santarelli – S.-A. Fusco (ed.), 1, Milano 1980, pp. 325-327; G. Schubart-Fikentscher, Carpzov, Benedict, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 1, cit. (note 1), coll. 595-597; G. Kleinheyer – J. Schröder, Deutschen Juristen aus fünf Jahrhunderten: eine biographische Einführung in die Geschichte der Rechtswissenschaft, unter Mitarbeit von E. Forster, H. Hof und B. Pahlmann, Heidelberg 19893, pp. 53-57; Dezza, Accusa e inquisizione , cit. (note 33), pp. 82-88; Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), pp. 70-72; J. Otto, Carpzov, Benedict, in Juristen. Ein biographisches Lexikon. Von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, M. Stolleis (ed.), München 1995, pp. 115-116; I. Kabus, Der Inquisitionprozeß im Mittelalter und der frühen Neuzeit, in „Auss Liebe der Gerechtigkeit vnd umb gemeines nutz willenn”. Historische Beiträge zur Strafverfolgung, G. Jerouschek – H Rüping (ed.), Tübingen 2000, pp. 29-75, pp. 44-49; F.J. Casinos Mora, Benedikt Carpzov, in Juristas universales. 2. Juristas modernos. Siglos XVI al XVIII: de Zasio a Savigny, R. Domingo (ed.), Madrid-Barcelona 2004, pp. 381-383; G. Jerouschek, Carpzov, Benedikt, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte2, 1, cit. (note 12), coll. 819-821; M. Schmoeckel, Benedict Carpzov und der sächsische Prozess. Mündlichkeit und Konzentration im sächsischen Verfahren vor dem Hintergrund des Ius Commune und der Reformation , in «Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung», 126 (2009), pp. 1-37; T. Olechowski, Carpzov, Benedict, in Rechtsgeschichte und römisches Recht, cit. (note 14), p. 65.

[45] Carpzov, Practica Nova, cit. (note 44), q. 105, n. 23, p. 37, e n. 35, p. 39; q. 115, n. 10, p. 136. For modern legal scholars the defendant’s friends and relatives «conservano a lungo un ingombrante protagonismo processuale, anche in sede penale, sotto l’unitaria e generica denominazione di defensor» (for a long time kept an intrusive need to be at the centre of the attention also in criminal trials, being generically called defensor): M.N. Miletti,In giudizio per altri. La procura alle liti tra giurisprudenza moderna ed età delle riforme, in Agire per altri. La rappresentanza negoziale processuale amministrativa nella prospettiva storica, Convegno Università di Roma Tre (15-17 novembre 2007), A. Padoa Schioppa (ed.), Napoli 2009, pp. 593-636, p. 599.

[46] Carpzov, Practica Nova, cit. (note 44), q. 115, n. 90-103, pp. 142-143. For Carpzov’s admission of the defender in the criminal trial, cf. Esmein, Histoire de la procédure criminelle, cit. (note 27), pp. 311-312; Falk,Zur Geschichte der Strafverteidigung, cit. (note 33), pp. 412-419; Id.,De la torture judiciaire en Saxe, en particulier chez Benedict Carpzov (1595-1666), in La torture judiciaire. Approches historiques et juridiques, sous la direction de B. Durand, avec la collaboration de L. Otis-Cour, 2, Lille 2002, pp. 709-742, pp. 735-738.

[47] D. Clasen, Commentarius in Constitutiones Criminales Caroli V, Lipsiae 1718 (first edition 1684), ad art. 47, pp. 176-177, and ad art. 88, p. 272; Beyer, Delineatio iuris criminalis, cit. (note 42), ad art. 47, p. 96, and ad art. 88, pp. 156-157; J.P. Kress, Commentatio succincta in Constitutionem criminalem Caroli V, Hanoverae 1730 (first edition 1721), ad art. 88, p. 205. See also Henschel, Die Strafverteidigung, cit. (note 17), p. 74.

[48] J. Brunnemann, Tractatus iuridicus de inquisitionis processu, Wittebergae 1679 (first edition 1647), c. 8, m. 3, nn. 1, 5-6, 9-14, 18, 21-28, pp. 131-139. About Johann Brunnemann (1608-1672) see E.J.H. Steffenhagen, Brunnemann, Johann, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 3, Leipzig 1876, pp. 445-446; Stintzing, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 2, cit. (note 44), pp. 101-112; Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte, cit. (note 38), p. 327; Kleinheyer – Schröder, Deutschen Juristen, cit. (note 44), pp. 335-336; P. García Cavero, Johannes Brunnemann, in Juristas universales, 2, cit. (note 44), pp. 390-392; H. Lück, Brunnemann, Johann, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte2, 1, cit. (note 12), coll. 690-692.

[49] C. Manz, Commentarius rationalis in Criminalem Sanctionem Carolinam, Ingolstadii 1650, ad art. 47, nn. 15-18, 23, 25-27, pp. 197-201. About Caspar Manz (1606-1677) see A. v. Eisenhart, Manz, Kaspar, inAllgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 20, Leipzig 1884, pp. 281-285; Manz, Kaspar, in Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie, 6, München 1997, p. 602. About the method followed by Manz in his commentary see Rüping, Die Carolina, cit. (note 36), p. 172.

[50] Manz, Commentarius rationalis, cit. (note 49), ad. art. 47, nn. 28-29, p. 201. Another invective against the habits of lawyers ivi, ad art. 88, n. 16, p. 338. About the issues on this kind of oath see J.A. Brundage,The Ambidextrous Advocate: A Study in the History of Legal Ethics, in «Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert». Festschrift für K.W. Nörr, M. Ascheri – F. Ebel – M. Heckel – A. Padoa Schioppa – W. Pöggeler – F. Ranieri – W. Rütten (ed.), Köln-Weimar-Wien 2003, pp. 39-56, p. 44; Id.,The Lawyer as His Client’s Judge: the Medieval Advocate’s Duty to the Court, in Cristianità ed Europa. Miscellanea di studi in onore di L. Prosdocimi, I.2, C. Alzati (ed.), Roma-Freiburg-Wien 1994, pp. 591-607, pp. 593, 595-603; Bianchi Riva, L’avvocato non difenda cause ingiuste, cit. (note 21), pp. 9-77, 170-181.

[51] Manz, Commentarius rationalis, cit. (note 49), ad. art. 73, nn. 27-34, pp. 300-301. On the contrary see, for example, Ludovici, Caroli quinti … constitutiones criminales, cit. (note 42), ad art. 73, p. 68.

[52] C. Blumblacher, Commentarius in Kayser Carl deß V. und deß heiligen Römischen Reichs peynliche Halß-Gerichts-Ordnung, Salzburg 1752 (first edition 1670), ad art. 47, n. 6, p. 142. About Blumblacher (1624-1674) see P. Putzer, Christoph Blumblacher, in Juristen in Österreich, cit. (note 5), pp. 46-49.

[53] Clasen, Commentarius, cit. (note 47), ad art. 47, pp. 177-178; ad art. 73, pp. 246-249. About Daniel Clasen (1622-1678) see the short lemma in Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie, 2, München 1995, p. 331.

[54] See J.B. Suttinger, Observationes practicae ad stylum provincialis Austriae intra Onaesum, Nürnberg 1656, obs. 20, pp. 36-42; B. Finsterwalder, Practicae observationes ad consuetudines Archi-Ducatus Austriae Superioris, Salisburgi 1719 (first edition 1681), obs. 22, pp. 49-62; N. Beckmann, Reformata doctrina iuris, Norimbergae 1681, pp. 39-43. About these works see M.R. Di Simone, Aspetti della cultura giuridica austriaca nel Settecento, Roma 1984, pp. 18-31.

[55] Cf., for example, T. Granz, Defensio inquisitorum ex genuinis jurisprudentiae principiis, Francofurti et Lipsiae 1718 (first edition 1702), c. 4, s. 2, pp. 71-102.

[56] See, for example, B. Agricola, De advocato, sive de qualitatibus et officio boni advocati, Neapoli Nemetum 1618; A. Fritsch, Advocatus peccans, Francofurti et Lipsiae 1678.

[57] J.D. Thönnicker, Advocatus prudens in foro criminali, Chemnitii et Lipsiae 1710, cap. 4, pp. 11-18, and cap. 13, n. 2, p. 70. See also the Praefatio ad Lectorem.

[58] J.C. Frölich v. Frölichsburg, Commentarius In Kayser Carl des Fünfften … Peinliche Hals-Gerichts-Ordnung, Ulmae 1709, t. 18, n. 6, pp. 161-162; Kress, Commentatio succincta, cit. (note 47), ad art. 73, p. 186, mentioned an Anwald together with a friend and an uncle among the people who could plea for the imprisoned accused.

[59] Kress, Commentatio succincta, cit. (note 47), ad art. 47, §§ 3-4, pp. 128-129.

[60] H. Meier, De defensione pro avertenda inquisitione, Lipsiae 1738, §§ 2-5, pp. 4-7.

[61] Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 3.1, Text, cit. (note 5), p. 301.

[62] Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 3.1, Text, cit. (note 5), p. 400; D. Oehler, Wurzel, Wandel und Wert der Strafrechtlichen Legalordnung, Berlin 1950, p. 95.

[63] J.S.F. Böhmer, Elementa jurisprudentiae criminalis, Halae Magdeburgicae 1732, s. 1, c. 9, §§ 157-159, pp. 79-81, and c. 15, §§ 247-253, pp. 124-127. An overview of the opinions of other authors on many of the same issues is also in Id., Observationes selectae ad B. Carpzovii Practicam novam Rerum Criminalium Imperialem Saxonicam, Francofurti ad Moenum 1759, ad q. 115, pp. 54-58. About Johann Samuel Friedrich Böhmer (1704-1772) see J.F. v. Schulte,Böhmer, Johann Samuel Friedrich von, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 3, Leipzig 1876, p. 76; Landsberg,Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 3.1, Text, cit. (note 5), pp. 301-304; Schaffstein,Die allgemeinen Lehren vom Verbrechen, cit. (note 39), pp. 17-19; G. Boldt, Johann Samuel Friedrich Böhmer und die gemeinrechtliche Strafrechtswissenschaft, 1, Berlin-Leipzig 1936, pp. 1-46; E. Döhring, Böhmer, Johann Samuel Friedrich von, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, 2, Berlin 1955, pp. 391-392; Kleinheyer – Schröder, Deutschen Juristen, cit. (note 44), p. 335; Dezza, Accusa e inquisizione, cit. (note 33), pp. 89-92; Id., Lezioni, cit. (note 16), pp. 72-73; F. Hess, Böhmer, Johann Samuel Friedrich, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte2, 1, cit. (note 12), col. 640.

[64] Böhmer, Meditationes, cit. (note 42), ad art. 47, §§ 1-6, pp. 192-197; ad art. 73, § 3, p. 269.

[65] Cf. L. Garlati, Inseguendo la verità. Processo penale e giustizia nel Ristretto della prattica criminale per lo Stato di Milano, Milano 1999, pp. 141, 144-145; Dezza, Il divieto, cit. (note 12), pp. CCIV-CCV; Id., Il nemico della verità, cit. (note 12), pp. 19-20, 69-70. La ricerca della verità «è il nòcciolo dell’inquisitorio austriaco» (the search for the truth is the core of the Austrian inquisitorial trial): Miletti, Per quali vie convenga investigare la verità, cit. (note 17), p. LXIX.

[66] Gleispach, Das österreichische Strafverfahren, cit. (note 22), p. 9.